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Abstract
The POSSIBLE-WINNER problem asks, given an election where the voters’ preferences over the set of
candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work,
we consider the computational complexity of POSSIBLE-WINNER under the assumption that the voter
preferences are partitioned. That is, we assume that every voter provides a complete order over sets of
incomparable candidates (e.g., candidates are ranked by their level of education). We consider elections
with partitioned profiles over positional scoring rules, with an unbounded number of candidates, and
unweighted voters. Our first result is a polynomial time algorithm for voting rules with 2 distinct values,
which include the well-known k-approval voting rule. We then go on to prove NP-hardness for a class of
rules that contain all voting rules that produce scoring vectors with at least 4 distinct values.
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1 Introduction
In political elections, web site rankings, and multiagent systems, preferences of different parties
(voters) have to be aggregated to form a joint decision. A general solution to this problem is to
have the agents vote over the alternatives. The voting process is conducted as follows: each agent
provides a ranking of the possible alternatives (candidates). Then, a voting rule takes these rankings
as input and produces a set of chosen alternatives (winners) as output. However, in many real-life
settings one has to deal with partial votes: Some voters may have preferences over only a subset of
the candidates. The POSSIBLE-WINNER problem, introduced by Konczak and Lang [11] is defined
as follows: Given a partial order for each of the voters, can a distinguished candidate c win for at
least one extension of the partial orders to linear ones ?
The answer to the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem depends on the voting rule that is used. In this
work we consider positional scoring rules. A positional scoring rule provides a score value for every
position that a candidate may take within a linear order, given as a scoring vector of length m in the
case of m candidates. The scores of the candidates are added over all votes and the candidates with
the maximal score win. For example, the k-approval voting rule, typically used in political elections,
defined by (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) starting with k ones, enables voters to express their preference for k
candidates. Two popular special cases of k-approval are plurality, defined by (1, 0, . . . , 0), and veto,
defined by (1, . . . , 1, 0).
The POSSIBLE-WINNER problem has been investigated for many types of voting systems [4,
13, 18, 21]. For positional scoring rules, Betzler and Dorn [3] proved a result that was just one step
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away from a full dichotomy for the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem with positional scoring rules, un-
weighted votes, and any number of candidates. In particular, they showed NP-completeness for all
but three scoring rules, namely plurality, veto, and the rule with the scoring vector (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
For plurality and veto, they showed that the problem is solvable in polynomial time, but the com-
plexity of POSSIBLE-WINNER remained open for the scoring rule (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) until it was shown
to be NP-complete as well by Baumeister and Rothe [2].
Partitioned preferences provide a good compromise between complete orders and arbitrary par-
tial orders. Intuitively, the user provides a complete order over sets of incomparable items. In the
machine learning community, partitioned preferences were shown to be common in many real-life
datasets, and have been used for learning statistical models on full and partial rankings [14, 17, 10].
In many scenarios, the user preferences are inherently partitioned. In recommender systems, the
items are often partitioned according to their numerical level of desirability [19] (e.g., the common
star-rating system, where the scores range between 1 and 5 stars). In such a scenario, all items with
identical scores are incomparable. In some e-commerce systems, user preferences are obtained by
tracking the various actions users perform [12]. For example, searching or browsing a product is
indicative of weak interest. Bookmarking it is indicative of stronger interest, followed by entering
the product to the “shopping cart”. Finally, the strongest indication would be actually purchasing
the product. In this case as well, the items are partitioned into groups, where the desirability of each
group is determined by its set of associated actions, and items in a common group are considered
incomparable. In the field of information retrieval, learning to rank [5, 16] refers to the process of
applying machine learning techniques to rank a set of documents according to their relevance to a
given query. In this setting, document scores are indicative of relevance to the query, and documents
with identical scores are considered incomparable.
In this work we investigate the computational complexity of the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem
with partitioned preference profiles. Our first result is that determining the possible winner can be
performed in polynomial time for 2-valued voting rules (i.e., that produce scoring vectors with 2
distinct values), which include the k-approval voting rule. We then show that our algorithm also
solves the possible winner problem for the (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) voting rule. These result are surprising
because both of these rules are NP-complete when the partitioned assumption is dropped [3, 2]. We
then go on and prove hardness for the class of voting rules that produce scoring vectors containing
at least 4 distinct values, and a large class of voting rules with 3 distinct values. The hardness proofs
are involved because many of the order restrictions applied in the reductions for the general case are
unavailable under the constraint of partitioned preferences.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present some basic notation and terminology that we use throughout the manu-
script.
2.1 Orders and rankings
A partially ordered set is a binary relation  over a set of alternatives, or candidates C that satisfies
transitivity (a  b and b  c implies a  c) and irreflexivity (a  a never holds). A linear (or total)
order is a partially ordered set where every two items are comparable. We say that a total order t
extends the partial order o if, for every pair of alternatives, a, b such that a o b it also holds that
a t b. We denote by lin(C) the set of all linear orders over C, and by lin(C | o) the set of linear
orders over C that extend o. In this manuscript we consider a special type of partial order termed
partitioned preferences.
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I Definition 1 (Partitioned preferences [15]). A partial order o is a partitioned preference
if the set of candidates C can be partitioned into disjoint subsets A1, . . . , Aq such that: (1) for all
i < j ≤ q, if c ∈ Ai and c′ ∈ Aj then c o c′; and (2) for each i ≤ q, candidates in Ai are
incomparable under o (i.e., a 6o b and b 6o a for every a, b ∈ Ai).
2.2 Elections
Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be a set of voters, and C = {c1, . . . , cm} a set of candidates. Every voter vi
has a preference, also denoted vi, which is a linear order or complete vote over C (i.e., vi ∈ lin(C)).
A tuple of n complete votes V = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ lin(C)n is an n-voter preference profile. The set
of all preference profiles on C is denoted by P(C). A voting rule is a function from the set of all
profiles on C to the set of nonempty subsets of C. Formally r : P(C) 7→ 2C \ {∅}. For a voting rule
r, and a preference profile V = (v1, . . . , vn), we say that candidate c ∈ C wins the election (or just
wins) if r(V) = {c}, and co-wins if c ∈ r(V). We denote an election by the triple I = (C,V, r).
We now generalize the election to the case where some or all of the votes are partial orders over
the candidates. We consider the election I ′ = (C,O, r) where the voter profile O = (o1, . . . , on)
is comprised of partial orders over the candidates. We say that a profile V = (v1, . . . , vn) extends
the profile O if they have the same cardinality (i.e., |O| = |V|), and every vote vi is a linear order
that extends the partial order oi (i.e., vi ∈ lin(oi)). We say that a partial preference profile O =
(o1, . . . , on) is partitioned if every one of its preferences is partitioned.
I Definition 2 (r-possible winner (co-winner)). Given an election I = (C,O, r) where O is a
profile of partial orders over the candidate set C, and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, does there
exist an extension V of O such that c = r(V) (c ∈ r(V))?
2.3 Positional scoring rules
Let I = (C,V, r) denote an election with m candidates and n voters. A positional scoring rule r
is defined by a sequence (~αm)m∈N+ of m-dimensional scoring vectors ~αm = (αm, αm−1 . . . , α1)
where αm ≥ αm−1 ≥ · · · ≥ α1 are positive integers denoted score values, and αm > α1 for every
m ∈ N+. A voting rule r = (~αm)m∈N+ is normalized if for every m ∈ N+ there is no integer
greater than one that divides all score values in ~αm, and α1 = 0. Since these assumptions have been
shown to be non-restrictive [9, 3] we will consider only normalized scoring vectors in this work.
We say that a positional scoring rule r = (~αm)m∈N+ is pure [3, 7] if for every m ≥ 2, the scoring
vector form candidates can be obtained from the scoring vector form−1 candidates by inserting an
additional score value at an arbitrary position such that the resulting vector meets the monotonicity
constraint. We note that for voting rules that are defined for a constant number of candidates, the
possible winner problem can be decided in polynomial time [6, 20].
Given a complete vote v ∈ V , and a candidate c ∈ C, we define the score of c in v by s(v, c) :=
αj where j is the position of c in v. The score of candidate c ∈ C in a profile V = {v1, . . . , vn} is
defined as s(V, c) =∑ni=1 s(vi, c). Whenever the profile V is clear from the context, we write s(c).
A positional scoring rule selects as winners all candidates c with the maximum score s(c).
Some popular examples of positional scoring rules are Borda, for which the scoring vector is
(m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0), plurality, for which the scoring vector is (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), veto, for which the
scoring vector is (1, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0), and k-approval (1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1), for which the scoring vector
is
1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, 0, . . . , 0
. We assume that the scoring vector, and thus the scores of the candidates,
can be computed in polynomial time given a complete profile.
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3 Summary of Results
In this manuscript we consider the possible winner problem over partitioned preferences (Defini-
tion 1). We assume that all positional scoring rules are normalized.
I Definition 3 (K-valued voting rule). We say that a positional scoring rule r = (~αm)m∈N+ is
K-valued if there exists a number n0 ∈ N+ such that for all m ≥ n0, the score vector ~αm contains
exactly K distinct values.
By this definition, the k-approval, veto, and plurality voting rules are 2-valued, while Borda has an
unbounded number of different score values.
I Definition 4 (unbounded-value voting rule). We say that a positional scoring rule r =
(~αm)m∈N+ has an unbounded number of positions with equal score values if, for every l ∈ N+,
there exists a number n0 ∈ N+ such that for all m ≥ n0, the score vector ~αm contains at least l
consecutive positions i+ l − 1, . . . , i where αi+l−1 = · · · = αi.
Let I = (C,O, r) denote an election where C is a set of candidates, r = (~αm)m∈N+ is a
positional scoring rule, and O is a partial profile where all of the votes are partitioned. In the rest
of the manuscript we show the following. If r is 2-valued, or if r is (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) then we show
that the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem over I can be solved in polynomial time. In particular, this
means that the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem is tractable for the k-approval voting rule. This result is
surprising because it has been shown that when the partitioned assumption is dropped, the problem
is intractable for both k-approval [3], and (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) [2].
Our hardness results, proved in Section 5, cover all scoring rules that produce scoring vectors
with at least 4 distinct values. For 3-valued scoring rules, we prove hardness for all rules except
vectors of the form (2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
k2
, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k0
) where k0 and k2 are fixed constants such that k0 +
k2 > 2, for which the complexity remains open. The main results are summarized in Theorem 5. A
scoring rule is called differentiating [7] if it produces a scoring vector ~αm that contains two positions
i, j ≥ 2 where j > i+ 1 such that (αj − αj−1) > (αi − αi−1).
I Theorem 5. Let r = (~αm)m∈N+ be a positional scoring rule. Then we have the following when
the preference profile is partitioned.
1. If r is 2-valued or if r is (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem over r can be
answered in polynomial time.
2. If r produces a scoring vector with at least 4 distinct values then the POSSIBLE-WINNER prob-
lem is NP-complete for r.
3. If r is 3-valued, and r produces a size-m scoring vector that is differentiating, or where the
number of positions occupied by either αm or α1 is unbounded, then the POSSIBLE-WINNER
problem is NP-complete for r.
4 Tractability
In this section we describe a network flow algorithm that solves the possible winner problem in poly-
nomial time for the k-approval and (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) rules, when the preference profile is partitioned.
Since we assume that the scoring vectors are normalized, then this algorithm is applicable to all
2-valued scoring rules. Some of the proofs in this section are deferred to the appendix.
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Maximal Scores
Given a partial order o ∈ O, and a candidate c ∈ C, we denote by smax(o, c) the maximum score
that candidate c can obtain in any linear extension v of o. That is, smax(o, c) := maxv∈lin(o) s(v, c).
It is straightforward to see that the maximum score of c in any extension of o is determined by the
cardinality of the set of candidates that are preferred to it in o. That is,
smax(o, c) = ~α (|c′ ∈ C | c′ o c|+ 1)
where ~α is the scoring vector. We denote by smax(O, c) the maximum score that candidate c can
obtain in any extension of the partial profile O to a complete profile. It is straightforward to see that
this score can be obtained by maximizing the score for each partial vote independently. Therefore:
smax(O, c) =
n∑
i=1
smax(oi, c)
When the partial profile O is clear from the context then we refer to this score as smax(c).
In many cases it is convenient to fix the position of the distinguished candidate c ∈ C in the
partial votes O such that its score is maximized. Formally, let O = (o1, . . . , on) denote the partial
vote. We denote by Oc = (oc1, . . . , ocn) the partial profile that is consistent with O, and where the
position of c is fixed at the topmost position in each vote. Then:
oci = oi ∪ {c  c′ | c′ 6oi c}
In this case, the score of c in any extension V of Oc is s(V, c) = s(Oc, c) = smax(O, c).
Elections with Partitioned Preferences
Let O = {o1, . . . , on} be a partitioned partial profile on C. Recall that O is a partitioned profile
if all preferences in O are partitioned. Lemma 7 below shows that for deciding whether a distin-
guished candidate c is a possible winner over a profile of partitioned preferences, we may restrict
our attention to extensions of the profile Oc where the position (and score) of c is fixed to the top of
its partition. This is not the case when the profile is not limited to partitioned preferences as shown
in the following example. The proof of Lemma 7 is deferred to the appendix.
I Example 6. We consider the election I = (C,O, r) where C = {a, b, c, d}, O = {o1, . . . , o5},
and r is the positional scoring rule corresponding to the vector ~α4 = (3, 1, 1, 0). We consider the
problem of deciding whether candidate a is a possible winner. The votes are as follows.
o1 a  b  c  d
o2 a  b  c  d
o3 b  a  c  d
o4 b  a  c  d
o5 b  a
Let V1 denote an extension of O in which v5 = (c  b  a  e). For V1 we have that s(a,V1) =
s(b,V1) = 9 making a a possible co-winner. Now consider the extension V2 in which v5 = (b 
a  d  c). For V2 we have that s(a,V2) = 9, and s(b,V2) = 11. Likewise, in the extension V3 in
which v5 = (b  a  c  d), b is, again, the winner of the election. So we see that despite the fact
that a is a possible co-winner in I, it is not the possible co-winner if positioned at its highest ranking
position in every vote.
I Lemma 7. Let I = (C,O, r) denote an election instance where O is a partitioned profile. A
distinguished candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner (co-winner) in I if and only if it is a possible
winner (co-winner) in Ic = (C,Oc, r).
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4.1 k-approval
Let I = (C,O, r) denote an election where O is a partitioned profile, and r is the k-approval voting
rule. As a consequence of Lemma 7, when dealing with partitioned preferences, we may restrict
our attention to extensions of Oc where c is positioned at the top of its partition in every vote.
Specifically, in every profile Vc that extends Oc, candidate c gets exactly smax(O, c) points. Now,
consider any other candidate c′ 6= c. If smax(O, c′) < smax(O, c) then we have that s(Vc, c′) ≤
smax(O, c′) < smax(O, c) = s(Vc, c). Therefore, c′ cannot be a winner (or co-winner) in any
complete profile Vc ∈ lin(Oc).
Otherwise, if smax(O, c′) > smax(O, c) then c can top c′ in Vc only if c′ is ranked in positions
k + 1, . . . ,m (i.e., receive 0 points) in at least smax(O, c′) − smax(O, c) of the votes in which it
could have received a point. Lemma 8 below formalizes this condition. The proof is deferred to the
appendix.
I Lemma 8. Let I = (C,O, r) be an election instance where O is a partitioned profile, and
r is the k-approval voting rule. Candidate c is a possible co-winner in I if and only if there
exists a complete profile Vc ∈ lin(Oc) where every candidate c′ 6= c is ranked in positions
{k + 1, . . . ,m} in at least (smax(O, c′)− smax(O, c)) of the votes in which c′ can receive a point
(i.e., {oi ∈ O | smax(oi, a) = 1}).
4.1.1 Network Flow Algorithm
Let I = (C,O, r) be an election whereO is a partitioned profile, r is the k-approval voting rule, and
c ∈ C is a distinguished candidate. We apply Lemma 8 in a maximum network flow algorithm for
deciding whether c is a possible co-winner in I. We begin by describing the network and then prove
the correctness of the algorithm.
Network Description
The network will contain the following sets of nodes:
1. A source node s, and sink node t.
2. Candidate nodes VC : all candidates ci ∈ C for which smax(O, ci) > smax(O, c).
3. Vote nodes VO: For every vote oi ∈ O where oi = (Ai1  · · ·  Aiqi), the network will contain
a single node oi,j where Aij (1 ≤ j ≤ qi) is the partition containing the index k. For example, in
the vote oi of Figure 1, the node oi,2 represents the second partition Ai2.
The edges of the network:
1. The set of edgesEs,C = {(s, ci) : ci ∈ VC}. The capacity of edge (s, ci) is u(s, ci) = smax(O, c′)−
smax(O, c). By construction, the capacity is strictly positive.
2. A candidate node a will have outgoing edges to all vote nodes oi,j ∈ VO in which it belongs to
partition Aij (in which it can lose a point). Formally:
EVC,VO = {(a, oi,j) : a ∈ Aij}
The capacity of every edge in EVC,VO is 1.
3. The set of edges EVO,t = {(oi,j , t) : oi,j ∈ VO}. The capacity of every edge (oi,j , t) is set to the
number of positions in the partition Aij whose corresponding score is 0. Formally, u(oi,j , t) =∑j
l=1 |Ail| − k. For example, in the vote oi of Figure 1, the corresponding edge capacity is
u(oi,2, t) =
∑2
l=1 |Ail| − k.
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Figure 1 A partitioned vote oi = {Ai1  Ai2  Ai3}
I Theorem 9. Let I = (C,O, r) be an election where r is k-approval and O is a partitioned
profile. A distinguished candidate c ∈ C is a possible co-winner in I if and only if the maximum flow
in the network is∑
{a∈C|smax(O,a)>smax(O,c)}
(smax(O, a)− smax(O, c)) (1)
Proof. The if direction.
Suppose that c is a possible winner in I. By Lemma 8, there exists a complete profile Vc ∈ Oc
such that every candidate c′ 6= c is ranked in positions {k + 1, . . . ,m} in at least (smax(O, c′) −
smax(O, c)) of the votes oi in which smax(oi, c′) = 1. That is, in Vc = (v1, . . . , vn), there exist
(smax(O, c′)− smax(O, c)) votes vi ∈ Vc in which smax(oi, c′) = 1 while s(vi, c′) = 0. Since r is
k-approval then in every such vote vi, candidate c′ is ranked in a position strictly greater than k (but
smaller than the index corresponding to its partition in vi). By the way we constructed the network,
there exist at least (smax(O, c′) − smax(O, c)) nodes oi,l ∈ VO for which there is a directed edge
(c′, oi,l). Pushing a flow of 1 on these edges, and repeating for every candidate c′ 6= c results in the
required maximum flow.
The only if direction
So now, assume that we have a maximum network flow (1), and we show how to construct a profile
Vc ∈ Oc in which c is the winner. A maximum flow of (1) implies that every candidate node ci ∈ VC
was able to push all of its incoming flow of (smax(O, ci)− smax(O, c)) to the vote nodes. That is,
there exist precisely (smax(O, c′)− smax(O, c)) nodes oi,j that received a unit of flow from c′.
In each of the corresponding votes oi, in which candidate c′ belongs to partition Aij , we position
candidate c′ somewhere in the range of positions {k + 1, . . . ,∑jl=1 |Ail|} where it receives a score
of 0. This is possible because given the maximum flow, and according to the capacities assigned to
the edges from nodes VO to t, we know that the number of candidates assigned to these positions in
the vote oi does not exceed the capacity of u(oi,j , t). Repeating this procedure for every candidate
node c′ 6= c, and placing the rest of the candidates in arbitrary positions, results in a complete ranking
that abides to the conditions of Lemma 8, making c a possible winner in I. J
I Example 10. Let I = (C,O, r) be an election instance where r is the 2-approval voting rule,
C = {a, b, c, d, e}, and O is a partitioned profile defined as follows.
o1 {b, c, d, e}  {a}
o2 {b, c, d}  {a, e}
o3 {b, e}  {a, c, d}
o4 {b, d}  {a, c, e}
o5 {c, d, e}  {a, b}
o6 {c}  {a, b, d, e}
The table below presents the number of points each candidate c′ has to lose (with respect to smax(c′,O))
so that c is the winner.
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Candidate smax(O, ·)− smax(O, c) + 1
a 0
b 2
d 2
e 1
The resulting network is presented in Figure 2. The blue edges can carry a capacity of 1. Bold
edges represent a flow that takes up the capacity of the edge. The flow presented in the figure may
correspond to one or more complete profiles Vc ∈ Oc in which c is the winner.
Figure 2 The network and flow of Example 10. Bold edges indicate a flow taking up the full capacity of
the edges.
4.2 The Positional Scoring rule (2, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0)
We now consider an election I = (C,O, r) where r is the (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) rule and O is a partitioned
profile. As usual, c ∈ C is our distinguished candidate. It has been shown that, in general, the
POSSIBLE-WINNER problem for (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) is NP-complete [2]. We show that the network
flow algorithm of the previous section solves this problem in polynomial time if O is a partitioned
profile.
Let oi ∈ O denote a partitioned vote and c′ 6= c a candidate with a maximum score smax(oi, c′)
in oi. If oi has two or more partitions then in any extension vi ∈ oi exactly one of the following can
occur: (1) smax(oi, c′) = s(vi, c′) = 2, (2) smax(oi, c′) = 2 and s(vi, c′) = 1, (3) smax(oi, c′) =
s(vi, c′) = 1 or (4) smax(oi, c′) = 1 and s(vi, c′) = 0. In all of these options, candidate c′ can lose
either 0 or 1 points in oi. Formally, for any candidate c′ 6= c, and any partitioned vote oi with at least
two partitions we have that (smax(oi, c′)− s(vi, v′)) ∈ {0, 1}.
Now, let us assume that oi ∈ O is a partitioned preference with a single partition. That is, oi
contains no precedence constraints. In this case, by Lemma 7, we can assume that any complete
profile V in which c wins (or co-wins), is an extension of Oc. In particular, this means that we may
assume that in vi ∈ V , candidate c is ranked in the topmost position and thus receives two points (i.e.,
s(vi, c) = 2). This, in turn, means that for any other candidate c′ 6= c exactly one of the following
can occur: (1) smax(oi, c′) = s(vi, c′) = 1 (2) smax(oi, c′) = 1 and s(vi, c′) = 0. As in the previous
case, candidate c′ can lose either 0 or 1 points in oi. Formally, smax(oi, c′)− s(vi, v′) ∈ {0, 1}.
Now that we have established that every candidate can “lose” at most one point in every vote,
we can apply the network flow algorithm of the previous section.
5 Hardness
Let r = (~αm)m∈N+ be a pure, positional scoring rule. From this point on we assume that r produces
a scoring vector with at least 3 distinct values (the case of 2-valued scoring rules was considered in
the previous section).
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I Definition 11. ([7]) We say that a voting rule r = (~αm)m∈N+ is differentiating if there exists
some constant n0 ∈ N+ such that for allm ≥ n0 the score vector ~αm contains two positions i, j ≥ 2
where j > i+ 1 such that (αj − αj−1) > (αi − αi−1).
Dey and Misra [7] have shown that the possible winner problem is NP-complete for all differentiating
scoring rules. The proof (Theorem 6) relies only on partitioned preferences, implying hardness of the
POSSIBLE-WINNER problem for differentiating scoring rules with partitioned profiles. Therefore,
we restrict our attention to non-differentiating scoring rules. Formally, for every scoring vector ~αm,
and for every pair of consecutive values αi, αi+1, we have that αi+1 − αi ≤ 1.
A common strategy in proving hardness for the PW problem is to construct a profile Q, consist-
ing of a set of linear orders, that enables determining the score of every candidate in C according
to the requirements dictated by the reductions [3, 7, 1, 2]. Once such a set is constructed, the
profile is enhanced with a set of partial votes P , where the maximum scores of the candidates are
restricted according to the linear votes inQ. Lemma 12 below [7] states that such a profileQ can be
constructed in polynomial time.
I Lemma 12 ([7]). Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} ∪D, (|D| > 0) be a set of candidates, and ~α a scoring
vector of length |C|. Then for every integer vector X = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ Zm, there exists a λ ∈ N
and a voting profile Q such that s(ci,Q) = λ + Xi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and s(d,Q) < λ for all
d ∈ D. Moreover, the number of votes in Q is polynomial in |C| ·∑mi=1 |Xi|.
Our NP-hardness proofs rely on reductions from the NP-complete 3-Dimensional-Matching
problem (3DM) [8]. The 3DM problem is defined as follows. We are given three disjoint sets
X , Y , and Z each containing exactly M elements, and a set S ⊆ X × Y ×Z of triples. We wish to
know whether there is a subset S ′ ⊂ S of M disjoint triples that covers all elements of X ∪ Y ∪ Z .
In some of our theorems, we will need functions that map each instance I of 3DM to a natural
number, and in some sense behave like a polynomial. For this sake, we call
f : {I | I is an instance of 3DM} 7→ N
a poly-type function for 3DM [3] if the function value f(I) is bounded by a polynomial in |I| for
every input instance I of 3DM.
I Lemma 13. A 3DM instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE-WINNER instance for a scoring
rule which produces a size-m scoring vector that fulfills the following. There is an i ≥ 2 such that
αi+k > αi+k−1 = · · · = αi > 0 with k ≥ 1, and m − k = f(I). A suitable poly-type function f
for 3DM can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let a denote the value that occupies positions i, . . . , i + k − 1 in ~αm. By the previous
discussion, and since r is non-differentiating, the scoring vector ~αm contains three indexes i, i− 1,
and i+ k such that αi−1 = a− 1, αi = a, αi+k = a+ 1. Schematically:
~αm =
. . . ,
i+ky
a+ 1, a, . . . ,
iy
a︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
,
i−1y
a− 1, . . .
 (2)
Let I = (E,S) denote a 3DM instance whereE = X∪Y∪Z . The set C of candidates is defined
by C := {c} ∪E ∪H ∪D where c denotes the distinguished candidate, E the set of candidates that
represent the elements of the 3DM instance, and H and D contain disjoint candidates such that the
following hold. We define H = ∪s∈SHs where the sets Hs are pairwise disjoint, and |Hs| = k − 1
for all s ∈ S. The sets Hs will be used for “padding” some positions relevant to the construction.
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The set D contains m − |E| − |H| − 1 candidates needed to pad irrelevant positions. We set
f(I) = |C \D|−k = |E|+(|S|− 1)(k− 1)− 1. Recall that f(I) = m−k. Intuitively, this means
that the portion of the scoring vector ~αm, occupied by values different from αi, is large enough to
contain all elements besides one of the sets Hs.
For every triple s = (x, y, z) ∈ S let Cs ⊂ (C \ {x, y, z}) such that |Cs| = i − 2 (see (2)). We
construct the following linear vote vs.
vs =
−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  x  y 
−−→
(Hs)  z 
−−→
(Cs)
where
−−−−→
(C \ Cs),
−−→
(Cs), and
−−→
(Hs) are arbitrary complete orders over the candidate sets C \ Cs, Cs, and
Hs respectively. Using vs we define the partial partitioned vote v′s as follows.
v
′
s =
−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  (x ∪ y ∪Hs ∪ z) 
−−→
(Cs)
Note that this implies that in any extension of v′s, items Hs ∪ s will occupy the positions in the range
{i− 1, . . . , i+ k}.
We denote by P = ∪s∈Svs and P ′ = ∪s∈Sv′s. By Lemma 12 there exists a set of linear votes
Q, of size polynomial in m, where the scores of the candidates in the combined profile P ∪Q are as
follows:
sP∪Q(x) = sP∪Q(c) + 2 ∀x ∈ X
sP∪Q(y) = sP∪Q(c)− 1 ∀y ∈ Y
sP∪Q(z) = sP∪Q(c)− 1 ∀z ∈ Z
sP∪Q(h) = sP∪Q(c) ∀h ∈ H
sP∪Q(d) < sP∪Q(c) ∀d ∈ D
We observe that the score of c is the same in any extension of P ′ ∪Q and is identical to its score in
P ∪Q. We define the instanceW of POSSIBLE-WINNER to be (C,P ′ ∪Q, r), and proceed with the
reduction.
In the forward direction, suppose that I is a Yes instance of 3DM. Then, there exists a collection
of M disjoint sets S ′ ⊂ S in S such that ∪s∈Ss = X ∪Y ∪Z . For every s ∈ S we extend the partial
vote v′s to v′s as follows.
v′s =
{−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  y 
−−→
(Hs)  z  x 
−−→
(Cs) s ∈ S ′−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  x  y 
−−→
(Hs)  z 
−−→
(Cs) s 6∈ S ′
where, again,
−−→
(Hs) is an arbitrary complete order over the candidates Hs. We consider the extension
of P ′ to P ′ = ∪s∈Sv′s. We claim that c is a co-winner in the profile P ′ ∪Q because:
1. For all x ∈ X : sP′∪Q(x) = sP∪Q(x)− 2 = sP∪Q(c)
2. For all y ∈ Y: sP′∪Q(y) = sP∪Q(y) + 1 = sP∪Q(c)
3. For all z ∈ Z: sP′∪Q(z) = sP∪Q(z) + 1 = sP∪Q(c).
4. For all h ∈ Hs: sP′∪Q(h) = sP∪Q(h) = sP∪Q(c).
5. For all d ∈ D: sP′∪Q(d) = sP∪Q(d) < sP∪Q(c).
For the reverse direction, suppose that the POSSIBLE-WINNER instance W is a Yes instance.
Then there exists an extension of the set of partial, partitioned votes P ′ to a set of complete votes P ′
such that c is a co-winner in P ′ ∪Q. We refer to the extension of v′s ∈ P ′ as v′s ∈ P ′.
We recall that the score of c is the same in any extension of P ′ ∪ Q and is identical to its fixed
score in P ∪ Q. We first claim that for every v′s ∈ P ′ in which x is not in position i + k (see (2)),
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then y occupies this position. Indeed, if z occupied this position then its score would increase by at
least 2 (i.e., compared to the vote vs). Since z cannot lose points in any of the votes v′s this would
mean that sP′∪Q(z) ≥ sP∪Q(z) + 2 = sP∪Q(c) + 1. But then we arrive at a contradiction that c
is a co-winner. Likewise, if some h ∈ Hs occupied this position then its score would increase by at
least 1 because, according to the construction, the position of h is fixed in the rest of the votes, and
thus, it cannot lose points in any other vote in P ′. Then, sP′∪Q(h) ≥ sP∪Q(h) + 1 = sP∪Q(c) + 1
contradicting the assumption that c is a co-winner. Finally, candidates in D cannot occupy position
i+ k in any extension of P ′.
We now claim that, for every x ∈ X , there exists exactly one triple s ∈ S such that x is not in
position i + k in v′s. Otherwise, by the previous claim, there must be at least two votes in which
position i+ k is occupied by candidates from Y . Since our profile contains more than M votes (i.e.,
|S| > M )), then by the pigeon-hole principle there exists a candidate y′ ∈ Y that appears in position
i+ k at least twice. But then, the overall score of candidate y′ must have increased by strictly more
than 1 point. However, in such a scenario, the score of y′ will be strictly more than the score of c
contradicting the fact that c is a co-winner in P ′ ∪Q.
Now, the claim follows from the observation that every x ∈ X must lose 2 points in order for c
to co-win. From the claim that there is exactly one vote v′s in which x does not occupy position i+k
for every x ∈ X , and since |X | =M , we have that P ′ contains precisely M votes corresponding to
triples S ′ ⊂ S in which x does not occupy position i+ k. Furthermore, for every s ∈ S ′ it must be
the case that x loses two points and thus v′s =
−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  y 
−−→
(Hs)  z  x 
−−→
(Cs).
We now show that ∪s∈S′ = X ∪ Y ∪ Z . It is clear that ∪s∈S′ ⊆ X ∪ Y ∪ Z , so we show that
∪s∈S′ ⊇ X ∪Y ∪Z . Assume the contrary. Then there is a candidate u ∈ Y ∪Z that does not belong
to ∪s∈S′ . If u ∈ Y , then by the claim that in every vote in which x is not in position i + k, there
is some candidate y ∈ Y in this position, and that |S ′| = M , there must be some candidate y′ ∈ Y
that appears at least twice in this position. But then sP′∪Q(y′) ≥ sP∪Q(y′) + 2 = sP∪Q(y′) + 1,
and we arrive at a contradiction that c is a co-winner. If u ∈ Z then by the same reasoning there
is some candidate z′ ∈ Z that appears at least twice in position i (see (2)). But then sP′∪Q(z′) ≥
sP∪Q(z′) + 2 = sP∪Q(z′) + 1, and we arrive at a contradiction that c is a co-winner. J
I Lemma 14. A 3DM instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE-WINNER instance for a scoring
rule which produces a size-m scoring vector that fulfills the following. There is an i ≥ 1 such that
αi+l−1 = · · · = αi with l = f(I) and there exists an index j such that αj ≥ αi+2 or αj ≤ αi− 2.
A suitable poly-type function f for 3DM can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We assume, without loss of generality, that αj ≥ αi + 2, the other case (i.e., αj ≤ αi − 2)
is symmetrical. Schematically, the scoring vector ~αm is:. . . ,
i+l+ky
αi+2, αi+1, . . . ,
i+ly
αi+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, αi, . . . ,
iy
αi︸ ︷︷ ︸
l=3M−2
, · · ·
 (3)
We define l = f(I) = 3M − 2 the number of positions carrying the value αi, and let k denote the
number of positions carrying the value αi+1 (see (3)).
Let I = (E,S) denote a 3DM instance whereE = X∪Y∪Z . The set C of candidates is defined
by C := {c} ∪E ∪H ∪D where c denotes the distinguished candidate, E the set of candidates that
represent the elements of the 3DM instance, and H and D contain disjoint candidates such that the
following hold. The set H contains dummy candidates that pad all but one of the positions occupied
by value αi+1. That is, H = {h1, . . . , hk−1}. The dummy candidates D pad the positions that are
irrelevant to the construction, such that |D| = m− |E| − |H| − 1.
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We build a partial profile P ∪ Q that consists of a set of complete votes Q, and a set of partial,
partitioned votes P . The set of partitioned votes P is defined as follows. For every triple s =
(x, y, z) ∈ S we let Cs ⊆ D ∪ {c} such that |Cs| = i − 1. The partitioned vote ps is defined as
follows.
ps =
−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  (s ∪H)  (E \ s) 
−−→
(Cs)
where
−−−−→
(C \ Cs), and
−−→
(Cs) denote arbitrary complete orders over the sets of candidates (C \ Cs) and Cs
respectively. We note that |s∪H| = k+ 2 and this set occupies positions i+ l− 1, . . . , i+ l+ k in
ps, and that |E \ s| = 3M − 3, occupying positions i, . . . , i+ l − 2 in ps.
Since the position of c is fixed in Q ∪ P it has the same score in any extension Q ∪ P of
Q ∪ P . We denote this score by sQ∪P(c). For any candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c}, the maximum partial
score smaxP (c′) is the maximum number of points c′ may make in P without beating c in P ∪ Q.
Since the score of c is fixed in Q ∪ P , then in order for c to win the election we must have that
smaxP (c′) = sQ∪P(c)− sQ(c′).
According to Lemma 12, we can set the score of any candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c} in Q such that its
maximum partial score smaxP (c′) is as follows.
1. For all h ∈ H: smaxP (h) = |S| · αi+1
2. For all x ∈ X:
smaxP (x) = ((nx − 1) · αi+2 + (|S| − nx + 1)αi)
3. For all y ∈ Y:
smaxP (y) = ((ny − 1) · αi+1 + αi+2 + (|S| − ny)αi)
4. For all z ∈ Z:
smaxP (z) = (αi+1 + (|S| − 1)αi)
5. For all d ∈ D: smaxP (d) > |S| · αm.
where, for any item e ∈ E, ne denotes the number of occurrences of e in the set of triples S.
In the forward direction, suppose that I = (E,S) is a Yes instance of 3DM. Then, there exists
a collection of M sets S ′ ⊂ S in S such that ∪s∈Ss = X ∪ Y ∪ Z . For every s ∈ S ′ we extend the
partial vote ps to ps as follows.
ps =
{−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  y 
−−→
(H)  z  x  −−−−→(E \ s)  −−→(Cs) s ∈ S ′−−−−→
(C \ Cs)  x  y 
−−→
(H)  z  −−−−→(E \ s)  −−→(Cs) s 6∈ S ′
We consider the extension of P to P = ∪s∈Sps. We claim that c is a co-winner in Q∪ P because:
1. For all h ∈ H: sQ∪P(h) = |S| · αi+1
2. For all x ∈ X :
sQ∪P(x) = (nx − 1)αi+2 + αi + (|S| − nx) · αi
3. For all y ∈ Y:
sQ∪P(y) = αi+2 + (ny − 1)αi+1 + (|S| − ny) · αi
4. For all z ∈ Z:
sQ∪P(z) = αi+1 + (nz − 1)αi + (|S| − nz) · αi
5. For all d ∈ D: sQ∪P(d) ≤ |S|αm
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That is, items E ∪ H precisely reach their maximum partial scores in Q ∪ P , thereby making c a
co-winner.
For the reverse direction, we verify a property of the construction called tightness [3] that is
crucial to the correctness: In total, the score of all positions that must be filled in the |S| votes equals
the sum of the maximum partial scores of all candidates. Once we establish tightness, it follows
that a candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c} cannot earn less than smaxP (c′) points since otherwise there must be
another candidate c′′ ∈ C \ {c} that makes more than smaxP (c′′) points, and thus beats c. We now
establish tightness with regard to the positions relevant to the construction {i, . . . , i+ l + k}. We
have a total of |S| votes, and the candidates of D ∪ {c} are fixed at positions {1, . . . , i− 1}, and
{i+ l + k + 1, . . . ,m}. Therefore, the total number of points for the remaining candidates H ∪ E
is:
|S| (αi+2 + (|H|+ 1) · αi+1 + αi + (3M − 3)αi) (4)
We now consider the sum of maximum partial scores of candidates H ∪ E. For the candidates
of H:∑
h∈H
smaxP (h) =
∑
h∈H
|S| · αi+1 = |H| · |S| · αi+1
Now, we look at the sum of maximum partial scores of candidates X . For this calculation note that∑
x∈X nx = |S|.∑
x∈X
smaxP (x) =
∑
x∈X
((nx − 1)αi+2 + (|S| − nx + 1) · αi)
=︸︷︷︸
|X |=M
M(|S|+ 1)αi −Mαi+2 +
∑
x∈X
nx · αi+2 −
∑
x∈X
nxαi
=︸︷︷︸∑
x∈X nx=|S|
M(|S|+ 1)αi −Mαi+2 + |S|αi+2 − |S|αi
= (|S| −M)αi+2 +Mαi + αi|S|(M − 1)
Now, we look at the sum of maximum partial scores of candidates Y .∑
y∈Y
smaxP (y) =
∑
y∈Y
((ny − 1) · αi+1 + αi+2 + (|S| − ny)αi)
=
∑
y∈Y
ny · αi+1 −
∑
y∈Y
ny · αi −Mαi+1 +Mαi+2 +M |S|αi
=︸︷︷︸∑
y∈Y ny=|S|
(|S| −M)αi+1 +Mαi+2 + αi|S|(M − 1)
Finally, we look at the sum of maximum partial scores of candidates Z .∑
z∈Z
smaxP (z) =
∑
z∈Z
(αi+1 + (|S| − 1)αi)
=Mαi+1 +Mαi(|S| − 1)
=Mαi+1 + αi|S|(M − 1) + |S|αi −Mαi
= (|S| −M)αi +Mαi+1 + αi|S|(M − 1)
Adding up
∑
h∈H s
max
P (h)+
∑
e∈E s
max
P (e) we get exactly the total score of all positions that must
be filled (see (4)) with items H ∪ E. Thus, tightness follows.
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Now that we have established tightness, suppose that the POSSIBLE-WINNER instance W =
(C,P, r) is a Yes instance. Then there exists an extension of the set of partial, partitioned votes P
to a set of complete votes P such that c is a co-winner in P ∪Q. We refer to the extension of ps ∈ P
as ps ∈ P .
Before we continue we will require the following claim. For any s ∈ S the item that occupies
position i+ l + k in ps ∈ P is in X ∪ Y . The proof is as follows. Since c is a co-winner in P then,
by tightness, the total score of the items in X ∪ Y in P is:∑
x∈X
smaxP (x) +
∑
y∈Y
smaxP (y) =
|S|αi+2 +Mαi + (|S| −M)αi+1 + |S|(2M − 2)αi (5)
Since each vote provides the candidates of X ∪ Y with one of αi, αi+1, or αi+2 points, then even a
single vote, in which position i + l + k (scoring αi+2 points) is not occupied by an item in X ∪ Y ,
will result in a violation of tightness, because the sum will be strictly less than (5) 1.
From the previous claim it follows that no item h ∈ H can occupy position i+ l− 1 (scoring αi
points), because then, by tightness, this item would have to occupy position i+ l + k in at least one
of the votes, contradicting the previous claim. Therefore, in all votes ps ∈ P the items of H occupy
positions i+ l, . . . , i+ l + k − 1 scoring αi+1 points.
We observe that for any triple s = (x, y, z), item y must score either αi+1 or αi+2 in the exten-
sion ps. Otherwise, we immediately arrive at a violation of tightness with regard to smaxP (y). From
this we conclude that for any triple s = (x, y, z), either item x or z occupy position i+ l−1 (scoring
αi points) in ps. Furthermore, every item y ∈ Y scores αi+2 points exactly once in P . More than
once, and y scores more than c, and less would result in violation of tightness.
By tightness, there exist precisely M votes corresponding to M triples S ′ ⊆ S where item z
scores αi+1 points, freeing position i + l − 1. As previously argued, only item x can take this
position, freeing position i + l + k which can only be occupied by item y. We now show that S ′
covers all items X ∪Y∪Z . Assume, by contradiction, that there is an item x ∈ X that is not covered
by S ′. By the pigeon hole principle, there must be some item x′ ∈ X that occupies position i+ l−1,
scoring αi points, more than once. But then, we immediately arrive to a contradiction to tightness
with regard to smaxP (x′) because x′ can score αi exactly once for some triple in which it appears. If
there is some item y ∈ Y that is not covered by S ′, then there must be some other item y′ ∈ Y that
scores αi+2 points more than once, making it the winner. Overall, if c is a co-winner in P then the
set of triples S ′, where |S ′| =M cover all items X ∪ Y ∪ Z , and is thus a 3DM. J
The following corollary follows directly from Lemma 14.
I Corollary 15. Let r = (~αm)m∈N+ be an unbounded-value voting rule (Definition 4) that pro-
duces a scoring vector with at least 4 distinct values. Then the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem is
NP-complete for r.
6 Putting it all together
I Theorem 16. Let r = (~αm)m∈N+ be a voting rule that produces a scoring vector with at least
4 distinct values. Then the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem is NP-complete for r.
1 For the case in which there is an index j such that αj = αi − 2, we denote by αi−2 = αi − 2, and the resulting
sum would be |S|αi−2+Mαi+(|S|−M)αi−1+ |S|αi(2M −2). Then, we would reason that in every vote, the
item that occupies the single position scoring αi−2 points, is in X ∪ Y . Otherwise, some item e in X ∪ Y scores
more than smaxP (e) points in P , and c cannot be a co-winner.
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Proof. If r is an unbounded-value voting rule (Definition 4) then by corollary 15 the POSSIBLE-WINNER
problem is NP-complete for r. Otherwise, r produces a size-m scoring vector (~αm) such that every
distinct value in (~αm) occupies at most B positions for some fixed B. In particular, this means that
there is a value a ∈ (~αm) where a > 0, and a < αm that occupies at most B consecutive positions
in (~αm). But this means that there is an unbounded number of positions in ~αm outside the range of
a. By Lemma 13, the POSSIBLE-WINNER problem is NP-complete for r. J
I Theorem 17. Let r = (~αm)m∈N+ be a 3-valued voting rule. Then the POSSIBLE-WINNER
problem is NP-complete for r if it produces a size-m scoring vector where the number of positions
occupied by values 0 or 2 are unbounded.
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Lemma 14. J
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Appendix
LEMMA 7. Let I = (C,O, r) denote an election instance where O is a partitioned profile. A
distinguished candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner (co-winner) in I if and only if it is a possible
winner (co-winner) in Ic = (C,Oc, r).
Proof. The If direction. Assume that c is a possible winner (co-winner) in Ic = (C,Oc, r) where
r is a positional voting rule. Then there exists a complete profile V that is an extension of Oc where
c is the winner (co-winner). But since, by definition, lin(Oc) ⊆ lin(O), then V ∈ lin(O), making c
a possible winner (co-winner) in I as well.
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The Only-If direction. Let V = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ lin(O) denote the complete profile in which c is the
winner (co-winner) of I = (C,O, r). If V ∈ lin(Oc) then we are done. Otherwise, we show how we
can transform V into a complete profile V ′ ∈ lin(Oc) where c is the possible winner (co-winner).
Consider any vote vi ∈ V where vi /∈ lin(oci ). Since O is a partitioned profile, then oi is a
partitioned preference. Let oi = (A1  A2  · · ·  Aq) where the Ajs are disjoint partitions.
Let Al (l ≤ q) be the partition that contains the distinguished candidate c (i.e., c ∈ Al). Since,
by our assumption, oi is a partitioned preference then in any extension vi of oi, candidate c resides
in the range {∑l−1j=1 |Aj |+ 1, . . . ,∑lj=1 |Aj |}. In particular, the position that maximizes the score
of c is
∑l−1
j=1 |Aj | + 1. Let c′ be the candidate occupying this position in vi. If c′ = c then vi ∈
lin(oci ) contradicting our assumption. Thus c′ 6= c. Since all candidates positioned in the range
{∑l−1j=1 |Aj |+ 1, . . . ,∑lj=1 |Aj |} belong to the partition Al, and in particular the candidate c′, then
they are also incomparable in oi. Therefore, c and c′ are incomparable and can be swapped in vi
while still complying to the partial order oi.
Let us denote by v′i the ranking that results from swapping the positions of c and c
′ in vi. Clearly,
we have that (1) s(vi, c) ≤ s(v′i, c), (2) s(vi, c′) ≥ s(v′i, c′), and (3) for every c′′ /∈ {c, c′} it is the
case that s(vi, c′′) = s(v′i, c′′).
In the profile V ′ = (v1, . . . , v′i, . . . , vn) the candidate c is still a winner (co-winner) because its
score has increased while the score of any other candidate has not. We repeat this procedure for
every vote vi (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) until we reach a profile that is consistent with Oc as required. J
For every candidate a ∈ C we denote by VotesO(a, 1) the set of votes o ∈ O in which
smax(o, a) = 1. Formally: VotesO(a, 1) = {oi ∈ O | smax(oi, a) = 1}. Clearly VotesO(a, 1) can
be computed in polynomial time for every candidate a ∈ C (even if the profile is not partitioned).
We summarize the winning (co-winning) requirement in the following lemma.
LEMMA 8. Let I = (C,O, r) be an election instance where O is a partitioned profile, and
r is the k-approval voting rule. Candidate c is a possible co-winner in I if and only if there
exists a complete profile Vc ∈ lin(Oc) where every candidate c′ 6= c is ranked in positions
{k + 1, . . . ,m} in at least (smax(O, c′)− smax(O, c)) of the votes in which c′ can receive a point
(i.e., {oi ∈ O | smax(oi, a) = 1}).
Proof. By Lemma 7, candidate c is a PW in a partitioned profile O if and only if c is a PW in
Ic = (C,Oc, r). Now, c is a PW in Ic if and only if there exists a complete profile Vc ∈ lin(Oc)
where s(Vc, c) > s(Vc, c′) for every candidate c′ 6= c. Note that since r is k-approval, we have that:
|VotesO(c′, 1)| = smax(O, c′)
Therefore we can express s(Vc, c′) as follows.
s(Vc, c′) = |VotesVc(c′, 1)|
=︸︷︷︸
VotesO(c′,1)⊇
VotesVc (c′,1)
|VotesO(c′, 1) \ VotesVc(c′, 0)|
= |VotesO(c′, 1)| − |VotesO(c′, 1) ∩ VotesVc(c′, 0)|
= smax(O, c′)− |VotesO(c′, 1) ∩ VotesVc(c′, 0)|
Candidate c is the winner in Vc if and only if s(Vc, c) > s(Vc, c′) for any other candidate c′. By
definition of Oc we have that s(Vc, c) = smax(O, c). Therefore, c is the winner in Vc if and only if
smax(O, c) > s(Vc, c′), that is:
smax(O, c) > smax(O, c′)− |VotesO(c′, 1) ∩ VotesVc(c′, 0)|
XX:18 The complexity of the Possible Winner problem over partitioned preferences
or
|VotesO(c′, 1) ∩ VotesVc(c′, 0)| > smax(O, c′)− smax(O, c)
as required. J
